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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 












Civil Action File No. 
2012CV214140 
v. 
MORGAN STANLEY & CO., INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ON, THE APPEALING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
Before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Judgment 
on the Pleadings on, the Appealing Plaintiffs' Claims. Defendants Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., Men-ill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, and UBS 
Securities, LLC (collectively, "Defendants") move the Court for an order dismissing with 
prejudice the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Donna Cash ("South Carolina Plaintiff'); Richard 
Haskell, Susan S. Haskell, Jane Maj, and Robert Bair ("Illinois Plaintiffs")': James Baker, Jr., 
and Phillips W. Smith ("Arizona Plaintiffs"), and Robert Baker ("Florida Plaintiff') 
(collectively, "Non-Georgia Plaintiffs,,).2 Having considered the briefing, the Court finds as 
follows: 
I Defendants filed a separate "Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Judgment on the Pleadings On, 
Plaintiff Robert Bair's Claims" since he was inadvertently left out of the amended Complaint. Plaintiffs 
have amended their Complaint to fix the scrivener's error. Since Defendants adopt the same arguments 
set forth in this Motion, the Motions are considered together in this Order. 
2 Defendants do not seek dismissal of claims by certain Plaintiffs that were Georgia residents and 
therefore were not a part of the interlocutory appeal made by non-Georgia residents. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Court's dismissal of the claims brought by non-Georgia residents on interlocutory 
review. This Motion also sought dismissal of claims by Plaintiffs Raser Technologies, Inc., Kelly 
1 
Plaintiffs first filed suit on April 20, 2012, alleging that Defendants manipulated the 
value of Raser Technologies, Inc.'s stock prices through a form of stock manipulation know as 
naked short selling. The factual allegations have not changed and the conduct alleged has been 
fully described in prior orders and will not be repeated here. 
On February 8, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint alleging five counts: 
(1) Violations of Georgia RICO, (2) Violation of Georgia Securities Act, (3) Violations of 
Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, (4) Money Had and Received, and (5) Civil 
Conspiracy. The Court dismissed Counts 3 and 4 as to all Plaintiffs in its Order filed July 11, 
2013. Further, the Court dismissed without prejudice Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' Counts 1 and 2 
under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, and Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' Count 5 for civil conspiracy as 
there were no longer viable tort claims alleged. The COUli noted in its Order that Non-Georgia 
Plaintiffs "are permitted to re-plead within a reasonable time" bringing claims under the 
racketeering and securities laws of Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' respective home states. 
On August 19,2013, in response to the Court's July 11,2013, Order, Plaintiffs filed 
Amendments to First Amended Complaint raising Georgia RICO claims under the public policy 
doctrine of lex loci delicti and Nevada RICO and civil conspiracy claims for the two Nevada 
Plaintiffs. The other Non-Georgia Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's 
prior order, arguing that the public policy exception to lex loci delicti favored application of 
Georgia law over the law of other states. In an Order dated February 26, 2014, the COUli denied 
Trimble, Ocean Fund, LLC, Massai, Inc., and Warner Investments, LLC (the "Utah Plaintiffs"), but each 
of these Plaintiffs dismissed all their claims voluntarily without prejudice on September 18, 2015. 
Defendants are challenging that voluntary dismissal in their Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Under 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(b) and as such their claims are not addressed here. 
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reconsideration finding that the public policy exception would not be invoked in this case. Non- 
Georgia Plaintiffs applied for either an entry of final judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-1-54(b) 
or alternatively, an issuance of a Certificate oflmmediate Review under O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(b).3 
The Court granted the application under O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(b). During the appeal, the case was 
stayed with limited exceptions. On March 30, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed this COUl1's 
decision. The Court of Appeals' judgment was made the judgment of this Court on April 29, 
2015, when the Judgment Order on Remittitur was filed. 
On April 27, following remittitur, Defendants filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment 
against Non-Georgia Plaintiffs contending there were no issues remaining. Two months later, on 
June 26, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amendments to First Amended Complaint. Under this 
Third Amendment, Non-Georgia Plaintiffs fmally brought counts under their respective home 
states' laws, adding the following counts: (7) Violations of South Carolina Uniform Securities 
Act of 2005, (9) Violations of Illinois Securities Act of 1953, (10) Violations of Arizona 
Securities Act, (14) Florida RICO, (16) Nevada RICO, and (18) Colorado RICO.4 Because of 
the newly pled claims, the Court denied Defendants' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment as to 
these Non-Georgia Plaintiffs. 
3 Non-Georgia PLaintiffs Ronald Winchell and Joan W. Winchell of Nevada did not seek appeal because 
they pled under Nevada laws. Peter Emily of Colorado was added by the Court's February 2014 order 
and has asserted a RICO claim under Colorado law. 
4 Counts (6) New York RICO, (8) Tennessee RICO, (11) Washington RICO, and (15) Ohio RICO were 
amended out of this latest amendment. Counts (12) and (13), both alleging "Utah Unlawful Activity" 
were brought solely by Plaintiffs who have voluntarily dismissed all claims against Defendants. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendants seek dismissal of Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice under 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). It is well established that: 
[ a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
should not be sustained unless (I) the allegations of the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the 
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a motion 
to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed 
them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing 
patty's favor. 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73, 656 S.E.2d 820, 821 (2008) (quoting 
Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2),480 S.E.2d 10 (1997»; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
12(b)(6). 
Alternatively, Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings for certain Counts pursuant to 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c). "The granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 
[O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c)] is proper only where there is a complete failure to state a cause of 
action or defense." Lapolla Indus., Inc. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256,258 (2013), reconsideration 
denied (Dec. 5,2013), cert. denied (Mar. 10,2014) (quoting Pressley v. Maxwell, 242 Ga. 360, 
249 S.E.2d 49 (1978). "All well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true." Holland Ins. Grp., 
LLC v. Senior Life Ins. Co., 329 Ga. App. 834,836 (2014). "However, the trial court is not 
required to adopt a party's legal conclusions based on those facts." Id. 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Res Judicata and Amendment to Add New Claims After Appeal 
Defendants first argue the Court should dismiss all Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' claims 
because they are barred by res judicata and they failed to timely amend their Complaint after this 
Court urged them to do so in its Order dated July 11,2013. "A judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in 
issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the 
judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside." O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. "The 
fundamental elements of res judicata are: (a) the patties are identical; (b) the causes of action are 
identical; and (c) the prior adjudication was made on the merits by a court of competent 
jurisdiction." QOS Networks Ltd. v. Warburg, Pincus & Co., 294 Ga. App. 528,531 (2008). 
"Additionally, for the principle to apply, the party against whom the doctrine is raised must have 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the first action. Id. "It is the general rule 
that a judgment sought to be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata 
must be a final judgment." Lexington Developers, Inc. v. O'Neal Canst. Co., 143 Ga. App. 440, 
441 (1977). The purpose of res judicata is it "prevents the re-litigation of all claims which have 
already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or 
their privies in identical causes of action." Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Systems, Inc., 316 Ga. 
App. 7,9 (2012). 
The doctrine of res judicata "applies to attempts by amended complaint to relitigate 
matters that were or could have been litigated in the same action." Benedict v. Snead, 253 Ga. 
5 
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App. 749, 750 (2002) (physical precedent only). In Dove, for instance, the plaintiffs medical 
malpractice claims were dismissed on partial summary judgment as barred by the statute of 
limitations and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. 316 Ga. App. at 7. The plaintiff 
subsequently filed an amended complaint casting her medical malpractice claims as simple 
negligence claims, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss these claims based on res judicata, 
and the court granted the motion on these grounds. Id. at 8. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
noting that the new simple negligence claims were based on an identical set of facts and could 
have been put in issue before the adjudication of the prior claims. Id. at 9-10. Likewise, in 
Benedict, the Court of Appeals affirmed that res judicata barred amendment of a complaint to 
add a claim for return of earnest money after prior claims for specific performance of real 
property sales contract were dismissed on summary judgment and was affirmed on appeal. 253 
Ga. App. at 750. The plaintiff argued that the court's judgment was not final because other 
claims remained pending against a separate party. Id. The Court disagreed, finding the 
affirmance on appeal and exhaustion of the plaintiff s right to appellate review rendered the 
judgment final with res judicata effect. Id.; see also CenTrust Mtg. Corp. v. Smith & Jenkins, 
P. c., 220 Ga. App. 394, 396-398 (1996) (barring amendment to add claim against real estate 
closing agent for altering an executed real estate deed; prior professional malpractice claim for 
closing agent's failure to discover purchaser had filed for bankruptcy before closing had been 
dismissed because plaintiff failed to comply with affidavit requirement). 
In the case at hand, it is clear the parties and the facts underlying the former and new 
claims are the same. It is less clear whether the Court's choice of law determination (and the 
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affirmance by the Court of Appeals) is a determination on the merits that would bar Non-Georgia 
Plaintiffs' new claims under other states' laws despite this Court's express invitation to amend 
their Complaint. Having considered the parties' arguments and the case law, the Court holds 
that the new claims asserted are not barred. 
As Non-Georgia Plaintiffs argue, the cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable, 
particularly given that the Court expressly reserved the right for Non-Georgia Plaintiffs to amend 
their Complaint to add claims arising under their home states' laws. Non-Georgia Plaintiffs 
ultimately did amend the Complaint after the appeal was resolved and the stay lifted. 
Amendments are freely allowed until entry of a pre-trial order and the amendments relate back to 
the filing of the initial pleading. See O.C.G.A. 9-11-1S(a) & (c). The Court's order dismissed 
the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' claims under Georgia law without prejudice and invited them to re- 
plead under other states' laws. While Defendants argue that the affirmance on appeal converted 
the Court's order into a final judgment dismissing Non-Georgia Plaintiffs from the case, the 
Court views the final judgment more narrowly-the public policy exception to lex loci delicti is 
not available to Non-Georgia Plaintiffs. In sum, the Court invited Non-Georgia Plaintiffs to 
amend their Complaint and they did. 
The Court also rejects Defendants' argument that Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' amendments 
were not made within "a reasonable time" as ordered by the COUli. The case was stayed during 
the interlocutory appeal and the amended claims were brought within 2 months of the case being 
remitted to this Court following appeal. This is reasonable time given this case involves multiple 
individual plaintiffs and now multiple states' laws. Further, Defendants will not be prejudiced 
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by allowing these amendments, particularly considering that Defendants have sought stays in this 
matter since the appeal. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss all Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' claims on 
res judicata grounds is DENIED. 
II. Statute of Limitations 
Alternatively, Defendants assert that Counts 7, 9, and 10 of the Third Amendments to 
First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because they are time-barred. Counts 7, 9, and 
10 raise violations of securities laws in South Carolina, Illinois, and Arizona, respectively. The 
statute of limitation is two years under Arizona law and three years under both Illinois and South 
Carolina law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-2004(B); 815 Ill. Compo Stat. 5113(D)(2); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 35-1-509(j)(2). 
Plaintiffs argue the statutes oflimitations were tolled under each states' discovery rule. 
Under South Carolina law, "statute of limitation begins to run from the date the injured party 
either knows or should know, by exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action exists 
for the wrongful conduct." S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-509(j)(2). "If there is conflicting evidence as 
to whether a claimant knew or should have known he or she had a cause of action, the question is 
one for the jury." Moriarty V. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 341 S.c. 320,338-39,534 
S.E.2d 672, 681-82 (2000) (citation omitted). Under Illinois Securities Act, the statute of 
limitations "shall begin to run no later than the date upon which the party bringing this action has 
notice of facts which in the exercise of reasonable diligence would lead to actual knowledge of 
the alleged violation." 815 Ill. Compo Stat. 5113(D)(2). "The information available to the injured 
person with the exercise of reasonable diligence must be 'sufficiently probative of fraud- 
8 
Collentine, et al. V. Morgan Stanley & Co, LLC, et aI., CAFN 2012CV214140; Order on Motion to Dismiss 
sufficiently advanced beyond the stage of a mere suspicion, sufficiently confirmed or 
substantiated-not only to incite the victim to investigate but also to enable him to tie up any loose 
ends and complete the investigation in time to file a timely suit. '" Baron v. Chrans, No. 05- 
3240,2008 WL 2796948, at *21 (C.D. Ill. July 21, 2008) (quoting Marks v. CDW Computer 
Centers, Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir.1997» (noting Illinois state and federal law were 
similar as to notice inquiry standard). Likewise, under Arizona Securities Act, claims must be 
brought "within two years after discovery of the fraudulent practice on which the liability is 
based, or after the discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence." 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-2004(B). 
In this case, the initial Complaint was filed April 20, 2012. Defendants claim that a 
reasonably diligent investor would have been put on notice of the purported stock manipulation 
scheme when Raser issued a Press Release on September 19,2008.5 The Press Release stated 
Raser's belief that improper short sales were occurring and formally called on the New York 
Stock Exchange to investigate off-market trades and apparent naked short sales. However, the 
Press Release does not name Defendants or any other suspected wrongdoer by name. In 
response, Plaintiffs claim they would not necessarily have been aware of Defendants' ongoing 
involvement in the stock manipulation which was conducted through sophisticated and complex 
securities transactions from this Press Release alone. Whether a reasonably diligent investor 
would have constructive notice of the naked short selling scheme employed by these particular 
5 The Press Release was attached to Defendants' First Amendments to their Answer to Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint filed on August 14, 2015. Georgia law allows the COUlt to consider exhibits to 
pleadings, including answers, when considering a motion to dismiss. See Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
331 Ga. App. 512, 514 (2015). 
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Defendants when Raser issued its Press Release is not an issue that can be resolved by the COUlt 
as a matter of law at this stage in the litigation. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss Counts 7, 9, 
and 10 on statute of limitations grounds is DENIED. 
III. Privity Requirements under Securities Laws 
Alternatively, Defendants assert that Counts 7,9, and 10 of the Third Amendments to 
First Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law because there are no 
allegations that Defendants made, assisted or participated in, or induced Plaintiffs' purchases of 
Raser stock as required under the securities laws in Arizona, South Carolina, and Illinois.6 
Defendants argue Plaintiffs had not alleged Defendants' privity to Plaintiffs' transactions. 
Plaintiffs respond that in a manipulation on the market case like this one the privity requirement 
is necessarily relaxed. 
Plaintiffs' Count 10 asserts that Defendants violated Arizona securities law. In Arizona, 
It is a fraudulent practice and unlawful for a person, in connection with a 
transaction or transactions within or from this state involving an offer to sell or 
buy securities, or a sale or purchase of securities, ... directly or indirectly to do 
any of the following: 
1. Employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud. 
2. Make any untrue statement of material fact, or omit to state any material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
3. Engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit. 
6 All three states modeled their laws on federal securities law, in particular, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5, or 
"Rule IOb-5." 
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Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1991(A). Section 44-2003(A) allows actions brought under § 44- 
20017 to be brought against "any person, including any dealer, salesman or agent, who made, 
participated in or induced the unlawful sale or purchase" and makes them jointly and severally 
liable. AR.S. § 44-2003(A). However, "No person shall be deemed to have participated in any 
sale or purchase solely by reason of having acted in the ordinary course of that person's 
professional capacity in connection with that sale or purchase." AR.S. § 44-2003. While there is 
no allegation Defendants directly sold to Plaintiffs, it is a fact issue whether Defendants induced 
the sales by manipulating the market as alleged. See Grand v. Nacchio, 225 Ariz. 171, 175, 236 
P.3d 398, 402 (2010) ("Despite the possibility of overlap, if all inducers were thereby also 
automatically participants, use of the term "induces" in § 44-2003(A) would be unnecessary."); 
see also Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6,21,945 P.2d 317, 332 (Ct. 
App. 1996), as corrected on denial of reconsideration (Jan. 13,1997) (defining "induce" to mean 
"persuade or prevail" and finding lack of evidence in support of summary judgment that 
defendant was more than a remote, collateral actor). Plaintiffs have alleged they relied upon the 
assumption that a market for Raser stock was free from manipulation. However, Defendants' 
naked short sale transactions depressed the value of shares Plaintiffs bought, sold, and held 
which caused Plaintiffs' stock to lose value, impaired their non-monetary rights, and interfered 
with the ordinary and intended operations of those rights. Arizona Plaintiffs contend 
Defendants' naked short selling violated all three prohibited acts listed in § 44-1991(A). As 
such, Plaintiffs have stated a claim under Arizona law sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. 
7 This statute allows a person to bring a cause of action for violating § 44-2001, et seq. 
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Illinois Plaintiffs make a similar claim in Count 9 under Illinois law. Under Illinois law, 
it is a violation of the Dlinois Securities Act "to engage in any transaction, practice or course of 
business in connection with the sale or purchase of securities which works or tends to work a 
fraud or deceit upon the purchaser or seller thereof' or "to employ any device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud in connection with the sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly." 815 Ill. 
Compo Stat. Ann. 5112(F)& (I). A private cause of action is available to the purchaser of 
securities and "each underwriter, dealer, internet portal, or salesperson who shall have 
participated or aided in any way in making the sale" can be held jointly and severally liable. 815 
Ill. Compo Stat. Ann. 5/13(A). The Illinois Appeals COUli, looking to analogous federal law, has 
stated that "federal courts generally apply a relaxed analysis when a plaintiff asserts a scheme to 
defraud. Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, Ltd. P'ship V. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 
2012 1L App (1st) 112903, ~ 27,976 N.E.2d 415,425 (2012) (finding plaintiffs stated a claim 
under Illinois Security Act 5/12(1) against purported inside trader who plaintiffs allege 
manipulated prices to their detriment). "Because courts acknowledge the difficulty of * * * 
pleading a claim of market manipulation, where the exact mechanism of the scheme is likely to 
be unknown to the plaintiffs, allegations of the nature, purpose, and effect of the fraudulent 
conduct and roles of the defendants are sufficient for alleging participation." Id. (quoting In re 
Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F.Supp.2d 549, 580 (S.D.Tex. 2002) 
(citation omitted). Given Plaintiffs' allegations, as described above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
alleged a breach of Illinois Securities Act to survive the motion to dismiss. 
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Finally, in Count 7, the South Carolina Plaintiff alleges Defendants acts violated South 
Carolina Uniform Securities Act § 35-1-501. Under § 35-1-501: 
It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a 
security, directly or indirectly: 
(1) to employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) to make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading; or 
(3) to engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon another person. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-501. The Official Comments to the rule state this section was 
intended to cover market manipulation, However, violations of § 35-1-501 alone moe not 
sufficient to state a private cause of action. Official Comment Number 7 to this Section 
specifically states: "There is no private cause of action, express or implied, under Section 501. 
Section 509(m) expressly provides that only Section 509 provides a private cause of action for 
conduct that could violate Section 501." South Carolina Plaintiff asserts she has a private cause 
of action against Defendants as broker-dealers under § 3 5-1-509(g)( 4). This Section makes 
jointly liable "a person that is a broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser 
representative that materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability under subsections (b) 
through (£),8 unless the person sustains the burden of proof that the person did not know and, in 
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of conduct by reason of 
which liability is alleged to exist." S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-509. The Third Amendments to the 
8 Sub-section (b), for instance, allows a buyer to pursue a claim against "the person [who] sells a security 
in violation of Sections 35-1-301 or 35-1-501.. .. " See S.c. Code Ann. § 35-1-509(b). 
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First Amended Complaint allege Defendants violated § 35-1-501 but do not allege they are liable 
as broker-dealers who materially aided another, such as a seller, whose acts were prohibited 
under § 35-1-501. South Carolina Plaintiff has not alleged or identified a primary wrongdoer 
who would be liable under § 35-1-509(b) through (f), or how Defendants materially aided that 
wrongdoer. As such, South Carolina Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a private cause of 
action wlder South Carolina Uniform Securities Act to survive the motion to dismiss. 
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss Counts 9 and lOis DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss 
Counts 7 is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this L day of April, 2016. 
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